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Summary findings
Barth, Caprio, and Levine report cross-country data on  argue confidently that restricting commercial banking
commercial bank regulation and ownership in more than  activities benefits - or harms - the development of
60 countries. They evaluate the links between different  financial and securities markets or industrial
regulatory/ownership practices in those countries and  competition.
both financial sector performance and banking system  There are no positive effects from mixing banking
stability.  and commerce.
They document  substantial variation in response to  *  Countries that more tightly restrict and regulate the
these questions: Should it be public policy to limit the  securities activities of commercial banks are substantially
powers of commercial banks to engage in securities,  more likely to suffer a major banking crisis. Countries
insurance, and real estate activities? Should the mixing of  whose national regulations inhibit banks' ability to
banking and commerce be restricted by regulating  engage in securities underwriting, brokering,  and dealing
commercial bank's ownership of nonfinancial firms and  - and all aspects of the mutual fund business - tend to
nonfinancial firms' ownership of commercial banks?  have more fragile financial systems.
Should states own commercial banks, or should those  *  The mixing of banking and commerce is associated
banks be privatized?  with less financial stability. The evidence does not
They find:  support admonitions  to restrict the mixing of banking
There is no reliable statistical relationship between  and commerce because mixing them will increase
restrictions on commercial banks' ability to engage in  financial fragility.
securities, insurance, and real estate transactions and a)  *  On average, greater state ownership of banks tends
how well-developed the banking sector is, b) how well-  to be associated with more poorly developed banks,
developed securities markets and nonbank financial  nonbanks, and stock markets and more poorly
intermediaries are, or c) the degree of industrial  functioning financial systems.
competition. Based on the evidence, it is difficult to
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1I. Introduction
Financial systems in countries throughout the world range from fairly rudimentary to
quite sophisticated amd  from extremely fragile to relatively stable.  A growing number of studies
provide empirical evidence showing that well-functioninig financial systems accelerate long-run
economic growth by allocating funds to more productive investments than poorly-developed
financial systems.1 This convincing evidence has intensified calls for financial-sector reforms
that improye financial-system performance and thereby promote economic development.
Stable banking systems are an important componenit  of well-functioning financial
systems as has been vivzidly  demonstrated by recent developmaents  around the globe.  When
banking or, more generally, financial systems temporarily break down or operate ineffectively,
the ability of fiims to obtain funds necessary for continuing existing projects and pursuing new
endeavors is curtailed.  Severe disruptions in the intermediation process can even lead to
financial crises and, in some cases, undo years of economic and social progress.  Since 1980
more than 130 countries have experienced banking problems that have been costly to resolve and
disruptive to economic development.  This troublesome situation has led to calls for banking
reform by national governments and such international organizations as the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund. Apart from some fairly general proposals for reform, such as
greater transparency and an international financial authority, there are relatively few proposals
'For cross-country  evidlence  supporting  this relationship,  see King and Levine  (1993a,b),  Levine  and Zervos  (1998),
Beck, Levine,  and Loayza  (2000),  and Levine,  Loayza,  and Beck  (2000). In a similar  vein, Rajan  and Zingales
(1998)  provide  cross-country,  industry-level  evidence. Demirguc-]Kunt  and Maksimovic  (1998) show  that financial
development  increases  economic  growth  using firm-level  data, while Wurgler  (1999)  shows  the benefits of financial
development  for the allocation  of investment  across  industries  based upon  their growth  opportunities.  In a related
context,  Jayratne  and Strahan  (1996)  show that liberalizing  restrictions  on inter-state  branching  in the United  States
has led to more  rapid  state growth. More  generally,  Gertler  (1988)  and Levine  (1997)  provide  literature  reviews  on
the importance  of fimancial  systems.
2for specific  structural,  regulatory  and supervisory  reforms. 2 This is understandable  because there
is relatively  little empirical  evidence  to support  any specific  proposal.
To determine  specific  banking  reforms  that will limit bank fragility  and promote well-
functioning  financial  systems  requires  two steps. First, one must obtain cross-country  data on
bank ownership,  regulation  and supervision. This enables one to establish  the extent  to which
banks operate  in different  ownership,  regulatory  and supervisory  environments.  Only by
knowing  the regulatory  environment  can one really know what a "bank" is or what a "bank" does
in different  countries. Surprisingly,  such information  is not widely  available  from official
sources  for a wide range of countries. Yet, in practical  terms, it is the regulatory  environment
that actually  defines  what is meant  by the term "bank."  Second,  one must use such  data to
assess  the relationships  between  different  environments  and bank performance  or, more
generally,  financial  performance. Only by doing this can one really know  whether  "banks"
matter. In other words,  such an effort  enables one to better identify  those bank ownership,
regulatory  and supervisory  practices  that will foster financial  stability  and enhance  long-rum
economic  growth.
The purposes  of this paper are: (1) to collect and report cross-country  data  on bank
regulation  and ownership,  and (2) to evaluate  the links between different  regulatory/ownership
practices  and both financial-sector  performance  and banking-system  stability. In so doing  our
paper  helps fill the gap between questions  posed by policymakers  about  how to reform  banking
systems  and currently  available  evidence  on the issue produced  by researchers. The paper in
several  respects substantially  extends  the preliminary  investigation  reported  in Barth,  Capiio, and
2  The most  notable  exception  is  the Basel Committee  on Banking  Supervision's  proposed  new capital adequLacy
framework,  which  provides  for more  risk classes  and raises  the possibility  of using credit  ratings  to set risk weights.
For more information,  see Caprio  and  Honohan  (2000).
3Levine (1999).  This is done by enlarging our earlier sample of 45 countries to more than 60
countries; updating existing data; materially improving the quality of the data; adding new
information on the banlking  environment in different countries; and testing additional hypotheses.
Documentation is provided showing the substantial cross-country variation in regulatory
restrictions on various activities of banks, in legal restrictions on the mixing of banking and
commerce, ancl in barnk  ownership structure.  Although the socio-economic determinants of
regulatory cho6ces by governments are examined, the focus is on examining which types of
regulatory practices and ownership structures are associated with well-functioning, stable
banking systems.
Motivated by a long and divisive policy debate (es,pecially in the United States)  3 over
the extent to which the activities of banks should be limited, this paper examines the following
questions:
1.  D3o  countries with regulations that impose tighter restrictions on the ability of
commercial banks to engage in securities, insurance, and real estate activities have
(,a)  less efficient but (b) more stable financial systems?
2.  IDo  countries that restrict the mixing of banking and commerce - both in terms of
banks owning nonfinancial firms and nonfinarncial  firms owning banks -- have (a)
less efficient but (b) more stable banking systems?
3.  ]Do  countries in which state-owned banks play a large role have more poorly
iFunctioning  financial systems?
Those who favor restricting commercial banks to "'traditional" deposit taking and loan
making argue i:hat there are inherent conflicts of interest that arise when banks engage in such
activities as securities underwriting, insurance underwriting, real estate investment, and owning
3 For reviews  of the literature  regarding  this issue,  see Kwan and Laderman  (1999) and Santos  (1998a,b,and  c).
Also, see Barth, Brumbaugh  and Yago (1997),  Kane (1996),  Kroszner  and Rajan  (1994) and White  (1986)  for
discussions  of some of these  issues. On  November  12, 1999,  laws in the U.S.  restricting  banks  from engaging  in
securities  and insurance  activities  were repealed  [see  Barth, Brumbaugh  and Wilcox (2000)].
4nonfinancial firms.  Expanding the array of permissible activities, moreover, may provide greater
opportunities for moral hazard to distort the investment decisions of banks, especially when they
operate within a deposit insurance system [Boyd, Chang, and Smith 1998].  Furthermore, in an
unrestricted environment, the outcome may be the existence of a few large, functionally diverse,
and dominant banks that could (1) complicate monitoring by bank supervisors and market
participants 4 and (2) lead to a more concentrated and less competitive nonfinancial sector.
Relatively few regulatory restrictions on commercial banking activities and relatively few legal
impediments to the mixing of banking and commerce may therefore produce less efficient and
more fragile financial systems.
Those who favor substantial freedom with respect to the activities of commercial
banks argue that "universal" banking creates more diversified and thereby more stable banks.
Fewer regulatory restrictions may also increase the franchise value of banks and thereby
augment incentives for bankers to behave more prudently, with positive implications for bank
stability. Furthermore, the opportunity to engage in a wide range of activities enables banks to
adapt and hence provide the changing financial services being demanded by the nonfinancial
sector more efficiently. Thus, fewer regulatory restrictions on the activities of commercial banks
and the mixing of banking and commerce may produce more efficient and more stable financial
systems. 5 The lack of appropriate cross-country data, however, has impeded the ability to
examine the relationship between commercial bank regulations and both the functioning and
stability of the fmancial system.
4As Camdessus  (1997)  states:  "... the  development  of new  types  of financial  instruments,  and  the  organization  of
banks  into financial  conglomerates,  whose  scope is often  hard  to grasp and whose  operations  may be impossilble  for
outside  observers  - even (sic!) banking  supervisors  - to monitor."
5 Mishkin  (1999  p.686),  furthermore,  states  that "The  benefits  of increased  diversification  opens  up opportunities  for
reform  of the banking system  because  it makes  broad-based  deposit  insurance  less necessary  and weakens  the
political  forces  supporting  it."
5This paper  attempts  to rectify  this situation  arnd  in so doing  provides  the following
answers  to the questions  posed above. First, we do not find a reliable  statistical  relationship
between  regulatory  restrictions  on the ability  of commercial  banks to engage  in securities,
insurance,  and r  eal estate activities  and (i) the level of banking  sector  development,  (ii) securities
market  and nonbank  financial  intermediary  development,  or (iii)  the degree  of industrial
competition.  Indeed,  based on the cross-country  evidence,  it would  be quite difficult for
someone  to argue confidently  that restricting  commercial  banking  activities  impedes -- or
facilitates  -- financial  dLevelopment,  securities  market development,  or industrial  competition.
We do, however,  find that regulatory  restrictions  on the ability of banks to engage in securities
activities  tend to be associated  with higher interest  rate imargins  for banks. 6 Thus, even  though
there  may be some  negative  implications  for bank efficiency  due to restricting  commercial  bank
activities,  the main message  is that there is little relatiornship  between  regulatory  restrictions  on
banking  powers  and overall financial  development  and industrial  competition.
Second,  in terms of stability,  we find a strong  and robust  link to the regulatory
environment.  Countries  with greater  regulatory  restrictions  on the securities  activities  of
commercial  banks have a substantially  higher  probability  of suffering  a major banking  crisis.
More  specifically,  couxntries  with a regulatory  environmLent  that inhibits  the ability of banks to
engage  in the businesses  of securities  underwriting,  brokering,  dealing,  and all aspects  of the
mutual  fund  business  tend to have more fragile financial  systems. The positive link between
regulatory  restrictions  and major or even systemic  banking  crises,  moreover,  does not appear  to
be due to reverse  causation.
6 Tis  may reflect  the fact that in such  a situation  banks are limitecl  to the extent  they can  cover  costs  with fee
income.
6Third, we find no beneficial effects from restricting the mixing of banking and
commerce.  We specifically examine (1) the ability of banks to own and control nonfinancial
firms and (2) the ability of nonfinancial firms to own and control commercial banks.  There is
not a reliable relationship between either of these measures of mixing banking and commerce
and the level of banking sector development, securities market and nonbank financial
intermediary development, or the degree of industrial competition.
Fourth, restricting the mixing of banking and commerce is associated with greater
financial fragility.  Whereas restricting nonfinancial firms from owning commercial banks is
unassociated with financial fragility, restricting banks from owning nonfinancial firms is
positively associated with bank instability.  We find that those countries that restrict banks from
owning nonfinancial firms have a robustly higher probability of suffering a major banking crisis.
Thus, one of the major reasons for restricting the mixing of banking and commerce - to recluce
financial fragility - is not supported by the cross-country evidence presented in this paper.  This
finding is particularly notable in the wake of the East Asian crisis and the haste with which many
have concluded that all things Asian - including close ownership links - lead to crises.  Besides
the fact that for decades such links did not produce crises, our research shows that neither
concerns about financial sector development nor financial fragility should prompt calls for a
more restrictive environment.7
Fifth, greater state ownership of banks tends to be associated with more poorly
developed banks, non-banks, and securities markets.  In an independent study using alternative
measures of bank ownership, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) also examine the
relationship between government ownership and financial development.  They convincingly
7  For a view on ownership links that is relatively unfashionable today, see Lamoreaux (1994).
7show that government ownership retards financial development.  Thus, even though the
proponents of state ownership of banks argue that it helips  overcome informational problems and
better directs scarce capital to highly productive projects, the data assembled here and by La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) tell a different story.  On average, greater state
ownership of banks tends to be associated with more poorly operating financial systems.
Besides (iocumenting the substantial cross-country variation in commercial banking
regulations and.  ownership, our analysis of the data highlight some negative implications of
imposing regulatory restrictions on the activities of conmmercial  banks.  Specifically, regulations
that restrict the ability of banks to (a) engage in securities activities and (b) own nonfinancial
firms are closely associated with greater banking sector instability.  The analyses, moreover,
suggest no countervailing beneficial affects from restricting the mixing of banking and
commerce or from restricting the activities of banks in the areas of securities, insurance, and real
estate.
The research upon which this paper is based is still ongoing, so our paper should be
viewed as a progress report.  We are collecting considerably more information about bank
structure, regulation and especially supervision, and t]he  samnple  of countries is being enlarged.
The new cross-country data that we are collecting on the supervisory environment will permit us
- and others - to investigate more fully the interrelated issues of regulatory and supervisory
practices or policies.  Nonetheless, our efforts to date represent substantial progress on
understanding what a "bank" does in different countries and whether it matters.  By publishing
the existing data anid  reporting the empirical results, we are lhoping  both to contribute to the
ongoing debate over appropriate banking reforms and to facilitate further research on this
important topic.
8II. Bank  Regulations  & Ownership  vs. Financial  Development  & Industrial  Competition
The first section  in this part examines  the relationship  between  commercial  banking
regulations  and state ownership  of banks on the one hand and the level of financial  sector
development  and the degree  of industrial  sector  competition  on the other. The objective  is to
assess  whether  governments  that (1) restrict the activities  of banks, (2) inhibit  the mixing  of
banking  and commerce,  and (3) own a substantial  fraction  of the banking sector  tend to have (a)
more or less efficient  and developed  banks,  (b) better or worse functioning  securities  markets
and nonbank  financial  intermediaries,  and (c) greater  or lesser  competition  in the nonfinancial
sector. To examine  all these issues, we have  constructed  an extensive  data set.
The section's first subsection  introduces  the regulatory  and ownership  variables. We
define  the variables,  briefly  describe  their construction,  and present summary  statistics. The
second subsection  briefly describes  the various  measures  of financial  sector development  and
industrial  competition  that are employed. The final subsection  presents  our regression  results
and a summary  of our conclusions.
A. Regulatory  Restrictions  and Ownership
1.  Data Collection and Definitions
We have constructed  indices  on the degree  to which govermnent  regulators  permit
commercial  banks to engage  in securities,  insurance,  and real estate  activities. We have also
constructed  indices  on the degree  to which regulators  permit commercial  banks to own
nonfinancial  firms  and vice versa. Furthermore,  we have obtained  information  on the degree  of
state  ownership  of commercial  banks. We have assembled  this data and checked  its accuracy
9through  a number  of different  channels. Specifically,  we have obtained  the data used in this
paper primarily  frorn  irternational  surveys  conducted  independently  by the Office  of the
Comptroller  of the Currency  (OCC)  and the World  Bank. We have confirmed  the responses  for
as many countries  as possible  using information  from Barth,  Nolle, and Rice (2000),  the Institute
of International  Bankers (Global  Survey,  various years),  Euromoney  (Banking  Yearbook,
various  years), and various  central  bank and bank regulatory  agency  publications. When
inconsistencies have arisen,  we have - through the OCC and 'World Bank - attempted to
communicate  with Ihe relevant  national  regulatory  authorities  to resolve  them. While  some
remaining  problems  urndoubtedly  exist, we nonetheless  believe  we have assembled  the most
accurate  and comprehensive  data on commercial  bank regulatory  policies  to date.
Bank activities:  We use measures  of the degree  to which  national  regulatory
authorities  allow commercial  banks to engage  in the following  three "nontraditional"  activities:
Securities: the ability of commercial  banks to engage  in the business of securities
underwriting,  brokering,  dealing,  and all aspects  of the mutual fund  industry.
Insurance:  the ability of banks  to engage  in insurance  underwriting  and selling.
Real Estate:  the ability of banks to engage in real estate investment, development, and
managerment.
We have assessed each country's regulations concerning these activities and rated the
degree of regu]Latory  restrictiveness for each activity frcm 1 to 4, with larger numbers
representing greater restrictiveness.  The definitions of the 1 through 4 designations are as
follows:
10(1)  Unrestricted - A full range of activities in the given category can be conducted
directly in the commercial bank.
(2)  Permitted - A full range of activities can be conducted, but all or some must be
conducted in subsidiaries.
(3)  Restricted - Less than a full range of activities can be conducted in the bank or
subsidiaries.
(4)  Prohibited - The activity cannot be conducted in either the bank or
subsidiaries.
Mixing banking and commerce: We have constructed two measures of the degree of
regulatory restrictions on the mixing of banking and commerce. Again, we have rated the
regulatory restrictiveness for each variable from I to 4.  The variable definitions and the
definitions of the 1-4 designations are as follows:
Nonfinancial Firms Owning Banks: the ability of nonfinancial firms to own and
control banks.
(1) Unrestricted - A nonfinancial firm may own 100% of the equity in a bank.
(2) Permitted - Unrestricted with prior authorization or approval.
(3) Restricted - Limits are placed on ownership, such as a maximum percentage of a
bank's capital or shares.
(4) Prohibited -No equity investment in a bank.
Banks Owning Nonfinancial Firms: the ability of banks to own and control
nonfinancial firms.
(1) Unrestricted - A bank may own 100% of the equity in any nonfinancial firm.
(2) Permitted - A bank may own 100% of the equity in a nonfinancial firm, but
ownership is limited based on a bank's equity capital.
(3) Restricted - A bank can only acquire less than 100% of the equity in a
nonfinancial firm.
(4) Prohibited - A bank may not acquire any equity investment in a nonfinancial firm.
11State ownership:  We also have data on the degree  of state ownership  of banks:
Stateowned  Bank Assets:  State-owned  bank assets as a share  of total commercial
bank assets.
In terms of timing,  the data represent  the regulatory  environment  in 1997. In an earlier study,
we collected  information  on these regulations  for a smaller  sarnple  of countries  in 1995. Even
though  there were very few  regulatory  changes,  some of our assessments  changed,  as more
information  became  available. We discuss  the issue of regulatory  change  as it relates  to our
findings  in greater  detail below when we examine  the linkages  between  the regulations  and
banking  crises.
2.  Summary Statistics
Table 1 lists ithe  numerical values for each of ihe six indictors for the regulatory
environment.  We also compute a summary index of the first four indicators of the regulatory
restrictions imposed on banks.  Specifically, Restrict equals the average of Securities, Insurance,
Real Estate, and Barks  Owning Nonfinancial Firms.  Table 2 presents summary statistics
indicating the extensive cross-country variation in the data.  For example, there were nine
countries with very restrictive regulatory systems (Restrict > 3): Japan, Mexico, Rwanda,
Ecuador, Barbados, Botswana, Indonesia, Zimbabwe, arnd  Guatemala.  The value for the United
States is 3.  There were nine countries that pennitted wide latitude in terns  of commercial
banking activities (Restrict < 1.75): Switzerland, Suriname, South Africa, the Netherlands,
Luxembourg, United Kingdom, New Zealand, Austria, amd  Israel.  Furthermore, there is
substantial representation in terms of both geographical location and income level of the sample
countries.  Besides ihe 24 OECD countries, there are 14 Latini  American countries, 11 countries
12from Sub-Saharan Africa, and 12 from Asia, as well as 5 countries from northern Africa and
(non-OECD) Europe.
At the outset, we expected to observe that governments that restricted banking
activities in one area, say securities activities, would also restrict banking activities in other
areas, like real estate activities.  We therefore expected extremely large, positive correlations
among the Securities, Insurance, Real Estate, Banks Owning Nonfinancial Firms, and
Nonfinancial Firms Owning Banks variables.  There is clearly a positive association among the
different regulatory variables, but it is not extremely high.  Table 3 shows the correlations among
the six regulatory/ownership indicators.  While Securities and Real Estate are significantly
correlated with three of the four other regulatory indicators at the 0.05 significance level,
Insurance and Banks Owning Nonfinancial firms are significantly correlated with only two of the
four other indicators, and Nonfinancial Firms Owning Banks is not significantly correlated with
any of the others. Furthermore, the correlation coefficients on the statistically significant
relationships are all below 0.50. Thus, there is cross-country diversity in the individual
regulatory restrictions.  This suggests that it is important to examine each of the regulatory
variables individually, rather than only using a single index such as Restrict to capture the
regulatory environment.  Thus, even though we report the results on Restrict, we focus our
discussion almost entirely on the individual regulatory variables because they provide much
more information.
B. Financial Sector Performance and Industrial Competition: Definitions
This subsection describes the paper's  indicators of bank development, securities
market development, and industrial competition.  For each category, we considered a wide array
13of measures. We highlight  the measure  presented  in the tables as well as mention  the other
measures  that were stucdied.
1.  Bank Development
Net Interest  Margin  equals  net income divided  by total assets and is the average
value over the 1990-95  period (source:  Beck, Demirguc..Kunt,  and Levine 1999). While
recognizing  that:  many iFactors  influence  interest  rates besides the degree  of efficiency  of bank
operations,  we include this in our measures  of bank development  because  of its wide use in the
literature  and its empirical  availability.
Private  Credit equals  claims  on the private sector by deposit  money  banks and other
financial  institutions  as a share  of GDP and is the average  value over the 1980-95  period (source:
Levine,  Loayza,  and Beck 2000). This is a general and widely  used measure  of financial  sector
development. We also used such other measures  as: (a) claims by deposit  money  banks on the
private sector, (b) liquid liabilities,  and (c) total assets of the commercial  banking sector  relative
to GDP in 1997. These  alternative  measures  do not alter any of the conclusions,  however.
Bank Concentration  equals  the share of total assets of the three largest  banks and is
the average value over the 1990-95 period (source: Beclk,  Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine 1999).
This variable  captures  the degree  of concentration  in the banking  industry. We also used such
measures  as the:  nurnber  of banks per capita and the share of total assets of the single  largest
bank.  These alternative  measures  produced  similar  results, hiowever.
2,. Securities  Development
Totall  Value Traded equals the value of donmestic  equities traded on domestic
exchanges  divided by GDP,  averaged  over the 1980-95  period (source:  Beck, Demirguc-Kunt,
14and Levine 1999). Levine and Zervos  (1998)  show that stock  market liquidity  is important  for
economic  growth. They further  note  that it is liquidity  per se, not equity  market  capitalization,
that is crucial. We also used measures  of primary  market activity and bond market activity.
Specifically,  we collected  information  on the (i) total amount of outstanding  domestic  debt
securities  issued  by private or public  domestic  entities  as a share  of GDP, (ii) total equity  issues
as a share  of GDP, and (iii) private,  long-term  debt issues as a share  of GDP. While these
alternative  measures  yield similar  results, they are available  for far fewer countries.
Nonbank Credits equals nonbank financial institution claims on the private
nonfinancial  sector as a share  of GDP  and is the average value over the 1980-95  period (source:
Beck,  Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine 1999). To assess the robustness of our findings, we also used
direct  measures  of the size of particular  nonbank  financial  institutions,  including  insurance
companies,  mutual funds, and private  pension  funds. Again, these alternative  measures  produced
similar findings, but they are available for far fewer countries.
3.  Industrial Competition
Industrial Competition is based upon a survey question in which respondents
indicate  the degree  to which  they agree with the following  statement:  "market  domination  is not
common in your country"  (source: Dutz and Hayri 1999). To examine whether commercial
bank regulatory restrictiveness is associated with industrial competition, we also examined such
measures  as: (i) the degree of business  freedom  and competition,  (ii) the percentage  of economic
activity  controlled  by the 30 largest  companies,  and (iii) the perceived  effectiveness  of antitrust
policy.  These alternative measures produced similar results, however.
15C. Empirical  Results
The objective  here is to present  a rudimentary,  first-cut  empirical  evaluation  of the
relationship  between:
1. bank regulatory  restrictions  (a) bank development
2. mixing  banking  and commerce  and  (b) securities  development
3. state ownershlip  of banks  (c) industrial  competition.
Future work will deal more  rigorously  with specific  hypotheses  about such relationships  as well
as with numercus  methodological  issues.
Toward  ihis end, we first present  the simple  correlations  between each of the measures
of the regulatory/ownership  environment  and the indicators  of bank development,  securities
development,  and industrial  competition.  We then present  regression  results in which  we control
for economic  development  (i.e.,  the level of real per capita GDP) and an index of the quality of
governnent. More specifically,  Development  equals  the logarithm  of real per capita  GDP in
1980  (source:  Penn World Tables). Good Governmentt  equals the summation  of three
variables:  (i) risk of expropriation  by the government,  (ii) degree  of corruption,  and (iii) law and
order tradition  of the country,  with greater  values signifying  less risk of expropriation,  less
official  corruption,  and a greater  law and order  traditioji  (source:  LaPorta,  Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer,  and 'vishny (henceforth  LLSV) 1999).
It is important  to control for other features  o:f  the environment  in evaluating  the
relationship  between  the commercial  bank regulatory/ownership  regime  with financial
development  and indutstrial  competition.  For instance,  there may be countries  in which  corrupt
governments  that clo  riot enforce  the rule of law and tend to expropriate  private  property  have
16selected policies that have led to both poor economic performance and underdeveloped financial
systems. If such governments also uniformly enact certain types of commercial bank
regulations, we would not want to interpret a significant correlation between bank regulations
and financial development as representing an independent link unless we control for the quality
of the government.  We therefore use the simple measures described immediately above to
control for some natural characteristics of the policy environment in assessing whether there is
an independent link between the commercial bank regulatory/ownership structure and the
financial/industrial system more generally.  These variables to some extent also serve as a proxy
for the overall quality of bank supervision.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are
reported for these regression results.
The empirical findings are startlingly under-whelming as summarized in Tables 4-10.
First, it would be very difficult for someone to argue confidently that restricting the activities of
commercial banks adversely affects financial development, securities market development, or
industrial competition.  At the same time, it would be very difficult for someone to argue
confidently that easing restrictions on commercial banking activities facilitates greater financial
development, securities market development, or industrial competition.  Specifically, although
countries with more restrictive regulations tend to have less well-developed banking sectors and
securities markets as well as lower levels of industrial competition, the correlations are
frequently not statistically significant nor do they retain their values when controlling for oither
factors in a regression context.  Indeed, Securities, Insurance, and Real Estate do not enter any of
the regressions significantly when one includes Private Credit, Bank Concentration, Industrial
Competition, Total Value Traded, or Non-Bank Credits. As discussed above, these conclusions
17are robust  to a wide assortment  of measures  of banking sector  development,  industrial
competition,  and securities  market  development.
Second,  it would  be very difficult  to argue  that restricting  the mixing  of banking  and
commerce  - either  by restricting  bank ownership  of norfinancial  firms  or by restricting
nonfinancial  firm ownership  of banks -- impedes  or facilitates  overall financial  development  or
industrial  competition.  Banks Owning  Nonfinancial  Firms and Nonfinancial  Firms Owning
Banks  do not enter  any of the regressions  significantly.  These findings  hold when using
alternative  measures  oi banking  sector development,  industrial  competition,  and securities
market development.
Third,  there is some  evidence  that restricting  commercial  banks from securities  and
real estate activities  tends to raise  net interest  margins. Thus.,  restricting  commercial  banks from
securities  and real estate activities  may have some  negative  implications  for bank efficiency.
Taken  as a whole,  however,  the analysis  of the data indicate  little link between  the restrictiveness
of commercial  bank regulations  and the mixing of banking  and commerce  on the one hand and
financial  development  (taken  broadly)  and industrial  competition  on the other.
Fouith, in terms of state ownership,  the empirical  evidence  suggests  a negative
relationship  between  t]he  degree of state ownership  of banks and financial  development. 8
Countries  with greater  state ownership  of banks tend ta have less developed  banks and nonbanks.
It shouLd  also be notedL  in this context  that underdeveloped  financial  systems  tend to exert a
negative  influence  on long-run  growth [see Levine,  Loayza,  and Beck (2000)  and Levine
(1999)]. Although  considerably  more research  needs to be done before a causal  interpretation
8In this regard,  Cetorelli  and Gambera  (1999, p.23) in a study  assessing  the relevance  of the market  structure  for the
"finance-growth  relationship"  state  that "it would  be interesting  to investigate  whether it matters if banks  are
privately-or  state-owned."
18can be given to these findings, it may justify some concern among policymakers in countries
where state banks play a major role in credit allocation.  In this sample alone it appears that
about half the world's people live in countries with banking systems that are a majority state-
owned (Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Pakistan, and recently Indonesia), which underscores the
importance of this concern.
In sum, the lack of a close and reliable link between the regulatory environment and
overall financial development and industrial competition is robust to various alterations in the
conditioning information set and to redefinitions of the regulatory indicators.  In the analysis,
however, the regulatory variables take values ranging from one through four.  This particular
scaling may create an interpretation problem because the difference between a two and a three
may not be the same as the difference between a three and a four, or a one and two.  We
therefore examine the sensitivity of the empirical results to this scale in three ways.  First, we
created a new regulatory indicator that assumed values of one through three, rather than one
through four.  This new variable equals one if the original indicator equals one; the new variable
equals two if the original indicator equals two or three; and the new variable equals three if the
original indicator equals four.  Second, we created an additional regulatory indicator for each
category (Securities, Insurance, Real Estate, Banks Owning Nonfinancial Firms, and
Nonfinancial Firms Owning Banks) with values of either one or zero.  The additional regulatory
indicator takes the value one if the original indicator was one or two, and zero otherwise.
Finally, we also used separate dummy variables for each value between one and four.  In this
case, we created four dummy variables -- Securities 1, Securities2, Securities3, and Securities4.
Securitiesl equals one if Securities equals one and zero otherwise; Securities2 equals one if
Securities equals two and zero otherwise; and so on.  We created these new variables for all the
19regulatoiy indicators.  Using these alternative indicators, however, did not change this section's
conclusions.  The results are robust to changes in the other regressors too.  Also, it is important
to note that these conclusions are robust to the inclusion of reg;ional  dummy variables.  Thus, the
results are not simply reflecting regional differences in regulatory policies.  Furthermore, we
conducted the analysis using the individual components of Good Government instead of the
conglomerate index.  This modification also did not alter'  the results.  Lastly, we confirmed our
empirical results using indexes of bureaucratic efficiency, government red tape, and the degree to
which governments repiudiate  contracts.
III. Regulatory Restrictions, Ownership, and Banking Crises
This section evaluates the relationship between banking crises and (i) regulatory
restrictions on the activities of commercial banks, (ii) regulatory restrictions on the mixing of
banking and cormrmerce,  and  (iii) state ownership of banks.  Allowing banks to engage in a wide
range of activities may increase bank fragility by expancling  the set of external risks affecting
banks and by allowing banks themselves to choose amoong  a broader assortrnent of risky
ventures.  On the otlher  hand, allowing banks more freedom mray  lower bank fragility through
greater diversification of the sources of profits for banks.  This paper assesses which of these two
opposing forces tends to dominate.  In terms of state ownership of banks, we believe the links
will be more opaque.  State-owned banks that encounter difficulties may receive subsidies
through various channels, so that the banks are never identified as being in a crisis.  Nonetheless,
we conduct the analysis with the information available.  After describing our definition of
whether a country experienced a banking crisis or not, vwe  present probit regressions
incorporating the regulatory/ownership variables and a wide array of factors to control for other
20potential influences on bank fragility. We find that regulatory restrictiveness is positively linked
with financial fragility.  We then present evidence suggesting that this result is not due to reverse
causation.
A.  Definition of a Crisis
To investigate the relationship between the regulatory/ownership environment and
financial fragility, we use two measures of whether a county's banking system suffered a crisis
during the last 15 years.
Systemic is based upon Caprio and Klingebiel's (1999) determination as to whether a
country experienced a systemic banking crisis.  The variable takes the value one if there was a
systemic crisis and zero otherwise. They define a systemic crisis as meaning all or most of the
banking system's capital was eroded during the period of the crisis.  The assessments are made
for countries from the late 1970s into early 1999.
Major equals Systemic except for two adjustments. First, the Caprio and Klingebiel
(1999) indicator of systemic banking crises is expanded to include countries that experienced
major, though perhaps not systemic, banking crises over the 1985-97 period.  This results in.  the
addition of: Canada (15 members of Canadian Deposit Insurance Company failed), Denmark
(cumulative loses of 9 percent of loans), Hong Kong (9 out of 18 banks failed over the period),
India (nonperforming loans estimated as 16 percent of total loans), Italy (58 banks accountinig  for
11 percent of total loans were forcibly merged), and the United States (estimated savings and
loan clean-up costs of 3.2 percent of GDP).  Second, we exclude two countries (Israel and Spain)
from the Caprio/Klingebiel list of systemic banking crises because their crises occurred in lhe
late 1970s and therefore are outside our sample period.  We report the results using Major, but
21reach similar conclusions using Systemic.  The values of Major and Systemic are listed in Table
A3.
B.  Empiical  Results
The empirical results indicate that countries that restrict commercial banks from
engaging in securities activities and countries that restrict comlmercial  banks from owning
nonfinancial finns have a higher probability of suffering a major banking crisis.  Table 11
summarizes these findings.  Besides simple correlations, we present probit regressions that
control for other characteristics of the national environment.  Specifically, we control for the
level of economic development (Development) and the qjuality  of the government (Good
Government) in the probit regressions.  As shown, counltries with greater regulatory restrictions
on commercial bank securities activities and the ability of banks to own and control nonfinancial
firns  have a higher probability of experiencing major bEnking sector distress.
The positive and significant relationship between financial fragility and regulatory
restrictions on the securities activities of banks and restrictions on commercial bank ownership
of nonfinancial firms is;  robust to a number of alterations in the econometric specification.  First,
we obtain the same results using a logit estimation procedure.  Second, we obtain similar results
when controlling for the degree of private property righis protection, the degree to which
regulations restrict the opening and operation of businesses, a measure of bureaucratic efficiency,
the rate of economic growth, inflation, the existence of a deposit insurance scheme, and the size
of the financial intermediary sector (Private Credit).  Thus, wve  control for the standard variables
used in the large and growing empirical literature that tries to explain banking crises. The
coefficients on Secutrities  and Banks Owning Nonfinancial Firms remain significantly positive in
22the crisis regressions (when also including Development and Good Government). Third, as noted
above, we obtain similar results when using Systemic instead of Major as the indicator of
whether a country experienced a banking crisis or not.  Fourth, we obtain similar results when
using the alternative measures of Securities and Bank Ownership of Nonfinancial Firms as
discussed above.  Specifically, we also use the regulatory measures based on (i) values frorn one
through three, (ii) values of zero or one, and (iii) values of individual dummy variables for each
of the values one through four.  These alternative specifications do not alter the findings. F iffth,
these conclusions are robust to the inclusion of regional dummy variables; the results are not
driven by regional factors.  Sixth, since the degree of securities market development may
influence financial fragility, we also included measures of the degree of securities market
development.  Specifically, we used measures of:  (i) equity market liquidity, (ii) the issuance of
equity (in the primary market) as a share of GDP, and (iii) the issuance of long-term bonds (in
the primary market) as a share of GDP.  This modification did not alter the results and these
securities market indicators enter the crisis regressions insignificantly.  Similarly, we also tried
controlling for the net interest income of banks (Net Interest Margin), the degree of banking
sector concentration (Bank Concentration), and a measure of the degree to which the financial
system is primarily bank-based or market-based (Structure). 9 These additional variables did not
enter the crises regressions significantly.  Moreover, including these measures did not alter this
section's major conclusion: there is a positive, significant and robust relationship between bank
fragility and regulatory restrictions on securities market activities and bank ownership of
nonfinancial firms.'0
9 For a detailed  discussin  and analysis  of bank-based  vs. market-based  financial  systems,  see Allen and Gale
(forthcoming)  and Levine  (2000).
The source  of the additional  variables  used in this analysis  is Beck,  Demirguc-Kunt,  and Levine  (1999).
23C. Endogeneity
Endogeneity is an issue that merits further coinsideration. Countries that experience
banking crises might have responded to them by adopting regulatory restrictions on the activities
of banks. If this situation actually happened, it would be inappropriate to interpret the results in
Table 1  I as suggesting that regulatory restrictions increase the probability of a crisis occurring.
To control for poten,tial simultaneity bias, we have used a two-step instrumental variable
estimator. The differernt  instruments that are employed are presented in an appendix.  Using
instrumental variables did not alter the main results: countries in which banking systems face
greater regulatory restrictions on securities activities andl  on owning nonfinancial firms have a
higher probability of suffering a major crisis (see Barth, Caprio, and Levine 1999). However,
because the instrumental variables are not very good predictors of regulatory restrictions (see
Appendix), we decided to examine the issue of endogeneity using a more laborious - albeit less
statistically rigorous - procedure.
Table 12 presents the results of this effort.  As the lable indicates, for those countries
in our sample experiencing a crisis, information is provided regarding the dates of the banking
crises, the scope of the problems, and the estimated cosis of resolution. In addition, information
is provided as to whether or not there was any change irI regulations with respect to securities,
insurance, and real estate activities as well as to the mixing of banking and commerce during or
shortly after a banking crisis occurred.  For some countries and for some time periods, the
required regulatory information has not yet been obtained.  But for the majority of our countries
such information was available from publications of the Institute of International Bankers,
materials from ihe Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the World Bank Survey.
24Banking crises generally did not induce governments to enact more restrictive
regulations.  Indeed, the overall indication is that there was no change in these regulations: of the
250 possible entries in the table, 141 showed no subsequent change at all - neither during nor
immediately after the crisis, 14 showed a change in the direction of fewer restrictions (only 2 of
which could be linked to a crisis), and only 3 showed greater restrictions post-crisis; in 92 cases
we have no data.  So even in the relatively few cases in which there was a change during or after
a crisis, it was in the direction of broader powers for banks, meaning that we were using fewer
restrictions than actually existed.  This biases the results against the conclusion that greater
restrictions increase the likelihood of a crisis.
Governments generally do respond to banking crises, but the response has typically
been in the direction of limiting the bank safety net or raising its cost, as in the cases of the early
crises from the 1980s in Argentina and Chile, rather than attempting to restrict banks' powers.
Interestingly, both countries in fact have moved in the other direction, providing added powers to
banks, which is consistent with the general trend toward broader powers. More generally,,  any
concern about the endogeneity in the crisis regressions would appear to be unwarranted. "  l  Re-
estimating the probit regressions in Table 11 with the data from Table 12, moreover, does .not
produce any significant changes.
Thus, although the analysis does not fully resolve the endogeneity issue, the results
clearly suggest that greater regulatory restrictions on the ability of commercial banks to engage
" The inability  to make limits  on powers  stick may  be one reason  for this trend.  Bandiera,  Caprio,  Honohan,  and
Schiantarelli  (1999)  characterized  financial  reforms  as a vector  of variables  pertaining  to changes  over long  periods
of time  in interest  rate regulation,  reserve  requirements,  directed credit,  bank ownership  (moves  toward
privatization),  liberalization  of securities  markets,  prudential  regulation,  and intemational  financial  liberalization.
They  did not include  changes  in banks' powers  insofar  as there were so few changes. Note also that in the particular
case of the U.S.  banks  were allowed  to underwrite  corporate  debt in 1989  and corporate  equity  in 1990  through
subsidiaries,  but subject  to a revenue  restriction. In 1999  there  were more  than 40 banking  organizations  that  had
established  such subsidiaries.
25in securities activities and the ability of commercial banks to own and control nonfinancial firms
tend to increase  the probability  that a country  will experience  a major banking  crisis.' 2
IV. Summary  and 'Conclusions
The purposes  of this paper  have been twofold.  The first is to present  comprehensive
and detailed  inform.ation  on the regulatory  environment  and ownership  structure  of commercial
banks in a large  number of countries  around  the world. [t is found that  there is substantial
variation among  the more than 60 countries  in our sample  as to what banks are allowed  to do
with respect  to securities,  insurance  and real estate activities. A "bank" in one country,  in other
words,  is not necessarily  the same as a bank in another country. As a result of all the banking
crises  in different  countries  in recent  years,  there have been nuamerous  calls for banking  reforms.
Yet, they typically  fail to address  the issue as to exactly which  regulatory  environment  is most
appropriate  for simultaneously  promoting  bank performance  and stability. The information
presented  here  helps one to address  this issue by initially  recognizing  the substantial  cross-
country  variation  in bank regulation  that exists. This variation  occurs, moreover,  in countries
that differ in terms of geographical  location  and level of'  economic  development,  among  other
ways. At the same  time, it is found  that state  ownership  of banks varies from a high of 80
percent to a low of zero percent  in our sample  of countri.es.
The second purpose is to assess whether or not it matters  as to what a bank is
permitted  to do with respect  to securities,  insurance  and real e state activities. As summarized  in
Table 13, it malters  most as to whether  restrictions  are placed on securities  activities. The tighter
12  In this respect,  Kwan and Laderman  (1999,  p.24) in a review  of ]iterature  pertaining  to the U.S.  state that  "On the
effects  of securities  activities  on banking  organizations  safety  and soundness,  the bulk of empirical  evidence
indicated  some potential  for risk  reduction  in expanding  banks' securities  powers."
26the restrictions placed on this activity, on average, the more inefficient are banks and the greater
the likelihood of a banking crisis.  The likelihood of a banking crisis is also greater, on average,
the tighter the restrictions placed on bank ownership of nonfinancial firms.  Perhaps surprisingly,
none of these restrictions produce any beneficial effects with respect to financial development,
nonbank sector and stock market development, or industrial competition.  Nor is it found that
any of them lessen the likelihood of a banking crisis or enhance bank efficiency.  At the same
time, the greater the share of bank assets controlled by state-owned banks, on average, the less
will be financial development as well as the development of the nonbank sector and the stock
market.
It is important to emphasize that this paper is the product of an ongoing research
project.  Thus, as more information is collected and analyzed, the findings and conclusions
reported here may be modified.  This means that the paper actually represents a progress report
on a timely and important public policy issue. Much more work remains.  We are in the process
of collecting and analyzing information on supervision.  Optimal regulatory restrictions may
depend importantly on the type of supervisory regime.  Indeed, the choice of regulatory
restrictions may be importantly influenced by the efficiency of supervision.  We plan to explore
these relationships in future research.  The bottom line, however, is that the paper presents new
cross-country data and analyses on what a bank is and whether or not it matters.  And for now it
does indeed matter what a bank is permitted to do.  The imposition of tight restrictions on some
activities of banks appears not to be beneficial but, worse yet, downright harnful  in some
important ways.
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Country Data on Bank Regulations and State Ownership  of Bank Assets
SECURITIES  INSURANCE  REAL  BANKS OWNING  RESTRICT  NONFINANCIAL  STATE-
ESTATE  NONFINANCIAL  FIRMS OWNING  OWNED BANK
FIRMS  BANKS  ASSETS
Argentina  3  2  2  3  2.50  1  0.305
Australia  1  2  3  2  2.00  3  0.000
Austria  1  2  1  1  1.25  1  0.044
Barbados  3  4  3  4  3.50  2  0.195
Belgium  2  2  3  3  2.50  1  0.000
Bolivia  2  2  4  4  3.00  1  0.000
Botswana  2  4  4  4  3.50  2  0.000
Brazil  2  2  3  3  2.50  1  0.510
Canada  2  2  2  3  2.25  3  0.000
Chile  3  2  3  3  2.75  3  0.238
Colombia  2  2  2  4  2.50  1  0.19
Cyprus  2  2  4  3  2.75  3  0.034
Denmark  1  2  2  2  1.75  1  0.000
Ecuador  2  4  4  3.33
Egypt, Arab Rep.  2  2  3  3  2.50  0.666
El Salvador  2  2  4  4  3.00  2  0.069
Fiji  2  3  4  2  2.75  3  0.085
Finland  1  3  2  1  1.75  1  0.411
France  2  2  2  2  2.00  2  0.145
Gambia  2  4  2  4  3.00  2  0.000
Germany  1  3  2  1  1.75  1  0.429
Ghana  2  1  4  2  2.25  2  0.388
Greece  2  3  3  1  2.25  1  0.628
Guatemala  4  4  4  3  3.75  2  0.051
Guyana  1  3  3  3  1.75  3  0.233
Hong Kong  1  2  2  3  2.00  3  0.000
Iceland  2  2  4  3  2.75  1  0.644
India  2  4  4  2  3.00  2  0.800
Indonesia  2  4  4  4  3.50  1  0.415
Ireland  1  4  1  1  1.75  1  0.000
Israel  1  1  1  1  1.00  1
Italy  1  2  3  3  2.25  3  0.250
Japan  3  4  3  3  3.25  3  0.000
Jordan  2  4  3  2  2.75  1  0.000
Korea, Republic of  2  2  2  3  2.25  3  0.000
Lesotho  2  4  3  3  3.00  2  0.720
Luxembourg  1  3  1  1  1.50  3  0.000
Madagascar  2  4  3  3  3.00  2  0.220
Malaysia  2  2  3  2  2.25  2  0.096
Malta  1  3  3  3  2.50  4  0.475
33Table 1 (continued)
Country Data on Bank Regulations and Sitate  Ownership  of Bank Assets
SE'CURITIES  INSURANCE  REAL  BANKS OWNING  RESTRICT  NONFINANCIAL  STATE-
ESTATE  NONFINANCLAL  FIRMS OWNING  OWNED BANK
_____________  FIRMS  BANKS  ASSETS
Mexico  3  4  3  3  3.25  2  0.415
Netherlands  1  2  2  1  1.50  1  0.000
New Zealand  I  1  1  2  1.25  2  0.000
Nigeria  1  2  2  2  1.75  0.130
Norway  2  2  2  2  2.00  2  0.376
Pakistan  2  4  3  1  2.50  1  0.501
Peru  2  2  2  2  2.00  2  0.000
Philippines  1  2  2  3  2.00  3  0.198
Portugal  1  2  3  2  2.00  1  0.170
Rwanda  1  4  4  4  3.25  1  0.000
Seychelles  2  2  2  2  2.00  2  0.364
Singapore  2  2  2  3  2.25  1
South Africa  2  2  1  1  1.50  2  0.000
Spain  1  2  3  1  1.75  2  0.019
SriLanka  2  2  2  2  2.00  3  0.580
Suriname  I  1  1  3  1.50  3  0.277
Sweden  4  2  3  3  3.00  1  0.000
Switzerland  I  I  1  3  1.50  1  0.151
Tanzania  2  3  4  3  3.00  2  0.501
Thailand  2  2  2  3  2.25  3  0.290
Turkey  3  2  4  3  3.00  1  0.365
United Kingdom  1  2  1  1  1.25  1  0.000
United States  3,  3  3  3  3.00  3  0.000
Uruguay  2  3  4  3.00  0.455
Venezuela  2  2  3  3  2.50  3  0.072
Zimbabwe  2  4  4  4  3.50  2  0.246
34Table 2
Summary Statistics  for Regulatory and State-Ownership  Variables
RESTRICT  SECURMIES  REAL  INSURANCE  BANKS OWNING  NONFINANCIAL  STATE-OWNED
ESTATE  NONFINANCIAL  FIRMS OWNING  BANKS  ASSETS
FIRMS  BANKS
Mean  2.40  1.85  2.67  2.55  2.55  1.92  0.21
Median  2.38  2  3  2  3  2  0.15
Maximum  3.75  4  4  4  4  4  0.80
Minimum  I  1  1  1  1  1  0
Std. Dev.  0.67  0.75  0.98  0.95  0.97  0.86  0.23
Skewness  0.00  0.69  -0.18  0.47  -0.26  0.31  0.80
Kurtosis  2.12  3.39  2.03  2.01  2.09  1.84  2.55
Jarque-Bera  2.13  5.71  2.93  5.13  2.94  4.48  7.21
Probability  0.35  0.06  0.23  0.08  0.23  0.11  0.03
Observations  66  66  66  66  65  62  63
35Table  3
Correlations  for Regulation and State-Ovwnership  Variables
RESTRICT  SECURITIES  INSURANCE  REAL  BANKS OWNING  NONFINANCIAL  STATE-
ESTAT E  NONFINANCIAL  FIRMS OWNING  OWNED
FIRMS  BANKS  BANKS
ASSETS
Restrict  1.00  0.70  0.64  0.81  0.72  0.05  0.18
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.52)  (0.17)
Securities  1.00  0.25  0.43  0.42  0.00  0.11
(0.04)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.97)  (0.38)
Insurance  1.00  0.41  0.18  -0.03  0.13
(0°.°0  (0.16)  (0.85)  (0.32)
Real Estate  1.00  0.49  0.04  0.26
(0.00)  (0.74)  (0.04)
Banks Owning  1.00  0.19  0.01
Nonfinanciial  (0.14)  (0.96)
Firms
Nonfinancital  1.00  -0.09




Note: P-value is in paientheses.
36Table 4
Relationship Between Bank Regulatory Restrictiveness  and
Alternative Measures of Financial Development
Net Interest  Private  Bank  Industrial  Total Value  Non-Bank
Margin  Credit  Concentration  Competition  Traded  Credits
A. Correlations
Restrict  0.365  -0.299  -0.182  -0.324  -0.249  -0.068
(P-value)  (0.005)  (0.020)  (0.174)  (0.032)  (0.070)  (0.671)
B. Regressions
Restrict  0.007  -0.016  -0.101  -0.163  -0.022  0.067
(P-value)  (0.020)  (0.832)  (0.046)  (0.422)  (0.480)  (0.188)
Number  of Countries  57  60  57  44  54  41
R-square  0.28  0.47  0.12  0.29  0.18  0.46
Note:  Regressions  include  a constant,  the logarithm  of real  per capita  GDP,  and  the variable  GOOD
GOVERNMENT,  which  combines  measures  of expropriation  risk,  the law and  order  tradition  of the country,  and
the level  of corruption.
Note:  RESTRICT  equals  the average  of regulatory  restrictions  on the ability  of  banks  to engage  in (a) securities
activities,  (b)  insurance  activities,  (c) real  estate  activities,  and (d)  the ownership  of non-financial  firms.
37Table 5
Relaitionkship  Between Restriction of Securities Activities of Banks and
Alternative Measures of FinaLncial  Development
Net Interest  Private  Bank  Industrial  Total  Value  Non-Bank
Margin  Credit  Concentration  Competition  Traded  Credits
A. Correlations
SECURITIES  0.369  -0.121  -0.199  -0.273  -0.152  0.155
(P-value)  (0.005)  (0.359)  (0.137'p  (0.073)  (0.274)  (0.332)
B. Regressions
SECURITIES  0.007  0.010  -0.065  -0.131  -0.007  0.056
(P-value)  (0.016)  (0.860)  (0.197)  (0.316)  (0.809)  (0.121)
Numberiof  57  60  57  44  54  41 Countries
R-square  0.30  0.47  0.09  0.29  0.17  0.47
Note:  Regressions  include  a constant,  the logarithm  of real  per capita  GDP,  and  the variable  GOOD  GOVERNMENT,  which
combines  measures  of expropriation  risk,  the law  and  order tradition  of the country,  and  the level  of corruption.
Note:  SECURITIES:  the ability  of banks  to engage  in the business  of securities  underwriting,  brokering,  dealing,  and  all
aspects  of the mutual  fund  business.
Larger  values  imply  greater  restrictions  on  bank activities.
4 = prohibited;  3 = banks  (and  subsidiaries)  restricted  in activities;  2 =  permitted  in subsidiaries;  1 = permitted  directly
in the bank.
38Table 6
Relationship Between Restriction  of Insurance Activities of Banks and
Alternative  Measures of Financial Development
Net  Interest  Private  Bank  Industrial  Total  Value  Non-Bank
Margin  Credit  Concentration Competition  Traded  Credits
A.  Correlations
INSURANCE  -0.035  -0.194  -0.086  -0.110  -0.200  -0.031
(P-value)  (0.797)  (0.138)  (0.527)  (0.477)  (0.147)  ((0.845)
B.  Regressions
INSURANCE  -0.003  -0.011  -0.038  -0.010  -0.023  0.026
(P-value)  (0.321)  (0.843)  (0.272)  (0.926)  (0.405)  (0.382)
Number  of countries  57  60  57  44  54  41
R-square  0.25  0.47  0.06  0.27  0.18  0.43
Note:  Regressions  include  a constant,  the logarithm  of real  per capita  GDP,  and  the variable  GOOD  GOVERNIM4ENT,
which  combines  measures  of expropriation  risk,  the law  and order  tradition  of the country,  and  the level  of cormption.
Note:  INSURANCE:  the ability  of banks  to engage  in  the business  of insurance  underwriting  and  selling  insurance
products/services  as principal  and  as agent..
Larger  values  imply  greater  restrictions  on bank  activities.
4 = prohibited;  3 = banks  (and  subsidiaries)  restricted  in activities;  2 = permitted  in subsidiaries;  1  = permitted
directly  in the bank.
39Table 7
Relationship Between Restriction of Reali  Estate Activities of Banks and
Alternative Measures of Firnanciasl  Development
Net Interest  Private  flank  Industrial  Total Value  Non-Bank
_____________  Margin  Credit  Concentration  Competftion  Traded  Credits
A.  Correlations
REAL ESTATE  0.395  -0.346  -0.068  -0.236  -0.360  -0.218
(P-value)  (0.002)  (0.007)  (tl.617)  (0.123)  (0.008)  (0.171)
B.  Regressions
REAL ESTATE  0.006  -0.035  -0.045  -0.074  -0.042  0.022
(P-value)  (0.021)  (0.445)  (Cl.181)  (0.631)  (0.105)  (0.480)
Number of Countries  57  60  57  44  54  41
R-square  0.29  0.47  0.07  0.28  0.22  0.42
Note: Regressions include a constant, the logarithm of real per capila GDP, and the variable GOOD GOVERNMENT,  which
combines measwres  of expropriation  risk, the law and order tradition of the country, and the level of corruption.
Note: REAL ESTATE: the ability of banks to engage in real estate investment, development, and management.
Larger values imply greater restrictions on bank activities.
4 = prohibited; 3 = banks (and subsidiaries)  restricted in activities; 2 = permitted in subsidiaries; I = permitted directly in
the bank.
40Table 8
Relationship Between Restriction of Banks Owning Non-Financial  Firms and
Alternative Measures of Financial Development
Net Interest  Private  Bank  Industrial  Total Value  Non-Bank
Margin  Credit  Concentration  Competition  Traded  Credits
A.  Correlations
BANKS OWNING
NONFINANCIAL  0.339  -0.209  -0.081  -0.316  0.001  -0.101
FIRMS
(P-value)  (0.011)  (0.111)  (0.552)  (0.037)  (0.993)  (0.534)
B.  Regressions
BANKS  OWNING
NONFINANCIAL  0.004  0.021  -0.033  -0.102  0.027  0.049
FIRMS
0.007199  (0.066)  (0.629)  (0.266)  (0.411)  (0.270)  (0.131)
Number of Countries  56  59  56  44  53  40
R-square  0.26  0.47  0.06  0.29  0.19  0.46
Note: Regressions include a constant,  the logarithm of real per capita GDP, and the variable GOOD GOVERNMENT,
which combines measures of expropriation  risk, the law and order tradition of the country, and the level of
corruption.
Note: BANKS OWNING NONFINANCIAL  FIRMS: the ability of banks to own and control nonfinancial firms.
Larger values imply greater restrictions on bank activities.
4 = prohibited; 3 = less than 100% ownership; 2 = unrestricted,  but ownership  is limited based on bank's equity
capital; I = 100% ownership  permitted.
41Table 9
Relationship Between Restriction of Non-Financial Firms Owning Banks and
Alternative Measures of Financial Development
Net Interest  Private  BTink  Industrial  Total Value  Non-Bank
Margin  Credit  Concenatration  Competition  Traded  Credits
A.  Correlations
NONFINANCIAL
FIRMS OWNINl3  -0.056  0.065  -0.130  -0.193  0.029  0.132
BANKS
(P-value)  (0.690)  (0.996)  (0.354)  (0.216)  (0.842)  (0.429)
B.  RegressiDns
NONFINANCIAL
FIRMS OWNING  -0.003  0.072  -0.032  -0.123  0.011  0.043
BANKS
(P-value)  (0.364)  (0.165)  (0.412)  (0.272)  (0.701)  (0.139)
Number of  Cowutries  53  56  53  43  50  38
R-square  0.27  0.48  0.06  0.35  0.15  0.44
Note: Regressionis  include a constant, the logarithm of real per capita GDP, and the variable GOOD GOVERNMENT,
which combines measures of expropriation  risk, the law ancl  order tradition  of the country, and the level of
corruptioni.
Note: NONFINANCIAL  FIRMS OWNING BANKS: the ability of non-financial firms to own banks.
Larger values imply greater restrictions on bank activities.
1 = limits placed on ownership; 0 = no limits placed on ownership.
42Table 10
Relationship Between State Ownership  of Banks Assets and
Alternative Measures of Financial Development
Net Interest  Private  Bank  Industrial  Total Value  Non-Bank
Margin  Credit  Concentration  Competition  Traded  Credits
A.  Correlations
STATE-OWNED  BANK  0.216  -0.345  0.095  -0.247  -0.273  -0.380
ASSETS
(P-value)  (0.117)  (0.009)  (0.496)  (0.115)  (0.052)  (0.017)
B.  Regressions
STATE-OWNED  BANK  0.011  -0.275  0.007  -0.414  -0.129  -0.242
ASSETS
(P-value)  (0.522)  (0.088)  (0.962)  (0.562)  (0.065)  (0.012)
Number of  Countries  54  57  54  42  51  39
R-square  0.24  0.48  0.05  0.28  0.18  0.49
Note: Regressions include a constant, the logarithm of real per capita GDP, and the variable GOOD GOVERNMEhNT,  which
combines measures of expropriation  risk, the law and order tradition of the country, and the level of corruption.
STATE OWNERSHIP  BANK ASSETS: Percentage of bank assets accounted for by state-owned  banks.
43Table 11
Relationship Between Bank Crises and Bank Regulations and Policies
GOOD  RESTRICT  SECURITIES  INSURANCE  REAL  BANKS OWNING  STATE-  NONFINANCIAL  FINANCIAL
GOVERNMENT  EST-ATE  NONFINANCLIL  fWNED  BANK  FRMS  OWNING  STRIJCTURE
FIRMS  ASSETS  BANKS
A.  Correlations
BANK  CRISIS  -0.301  0.393  0.377  -0.006  0.298  0.418  0.217  0.188  -0.157
(P-value)  (0.019)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.964)  (0.020)  (0.001)  (0.102)  (0.161)  (0.267)
B.  Simple Probit Regressions
BANK CRISIS  -0.056  0.689  0.584  -0.154  0.300  0.527  0.873  0.237  -0.265
(P-value)  (0.372)  (0.020)  (0.015)  (0.436)  (0.123)  (0.010)  (0.296)  (0.233)  (0.643)
Numberof  Countries  61  61  61  61  61  60  58  57  52
Probability  0.052  0.009  0.006  0.089  0.039  0.005  0.105  0.124  0.014
I\  I
Note: Simple Probit Regressions include a constant, the logarithm of real per capita GDP, and the variable GOOD GOVERNMENT, which combines measures
of expropriation  risk, the law and order tradition of the country, and the level of corruption.  The Good Government regression includes Development  only.
Probability (LR statistic) is the P-value for the test that the coefficients  on the (nonconstant)  regressors equal zero.
44Table 12
Banking Crises:  Dates, Costs and Bank Regulatory  Responses
Change  in Regulations  for Allowable  Activities: Yes  or No  Coding of Banking Crises
Country  Year of  ScpEfrbe  stimateof Total  Bank Ownership  Non-financial
crsis  SopeofProblem  Losme/osts  Securities  Inurance  Real  Estate  ofNon-financial  Firm Ownership  Systemic  Major
Firms  of Banks
Argentina  19S0-19S2'  Morethan70  institutions  55.3 percetof  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A
were liquidated  or subject  GDP.
to central  bank
intervention  accounting
for 16  percent  of assets  of
conmmercial  banks and  35
percent  of total assets  of
finance  companies.
1989-1990'  Non-performing  assets  Yes, since  No  No  No  No
constituted  27 percent  of  1991,
the aggregate  portfolio  allowed to
and 37 percent  ofthe  act as
portfolios  of state-owned  underwriter
banks. Failed banks  held  in issuing
40 percent  of financial  piaedb
system  assets  p.vate debt
1995*  Suspension  of  eight  banks  Direct and  indirect No  No  No  No  No
and coDapse  of  tree  cost to public
banks.  Overall  through  the  estimated  at 1.6
end of 1997,  63 out  of 205 percent  of GDP.
banking  institutions  were
either  closed  or merged.
Bolivia  1986-1987'  Five banks  were  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  I
liquidated.  Total  NPLs  of
banking  system  reached
29.8 percent  in 1987;  in
mid-1988  reported  arrears
stood at 92 percent  of
commercial  banks' net
worth.
1994-*  Two  banks with 11  No  No  No  No  No
percent  of banking  system
assets  were closed  in
November  1994. In 1995,
four  out of 15  domestic
banks,  which  accounted
for 30 percent  of banking
system assets  experienced
liquidity  problems  and
suffered  from high  levels
of NPLs.
Brazil  1990*  (deposit  to bond  No  No  No  No  No
conversion)
1994-  By end 1997,  the Centma  In 1996,  negative  No  No  No  No  No
ongoing  Bank  had intervened  in, or  net worts of
put under  the Tempoary  selected  state  and
Special administration  federa funds  banks
Regime  (RAET)  system,  estimated  at 5-10
43 financial  institutions.  pereent of GDP.
Also by end 1997  non-  Costs  of individual
performing  loans  of the  bank
entire  banking  system  had  recapitalization,  by




3 bilion.  Banco
do  Brazil,  USD  8
billion.
Canada  1983-1985"  Fifteenmembersofthe  No, but  No, but  No  No  No  0
Canadian  Deposit  changed  changed  from
Insurance  Corporation,  from  prohibited  to
including  two banks,  prohibited  to  peemitted  in
failed.  pemitted in  1992.
45Table 12 (continued)
Bankinkg  Crises:  Dates, Costs and Bank Regulatory Responses
Change in Regplatoiln  for Allowable Achvities:  Yes or No  Coding  of  Banking Crib
Country  Year of  SrDpe  of F'robl  Estimate of Total  Bank Ownership  Non-financial
Crnsis  Loss/Costs  Securities  Insurance  Real Estai  of Non-financial  Firm Ownership  Systemic  Major
Firms  of Banks
Chile  1981-1983'  Authorites intervened  in  1982- 1985.  No, but  No, butstarting N,but  staing  in No  No, but  chaiged
four  banks  and four  tion-  government  spent  changed  in 1997  banks  19!13  banks  were  from unrestricted
bank fi ncial  insitutions  41.2 percentof  from  were slowed to aliawedto invest  to persmitted  in
(with  13 percent  of  GDP.  restricted  to  intermediate  in  l  estate  1993
outstanding  loirns)  in  penmitted  in  (sell)  insuraice  through
1981. In  l983, sevn  1997/8  through  stasidiaries tiu
banks md one financiers  subsidiaries.  spicialized  in
accourLting  for 45 percent  (IoUsing nd
of total assets.  By end-  office  space)
1983,  19  percent  of loans  leasing.
were Eon-perfbrinin.
Colombia  1982-1987'  Central  Bank  intervened  Costs of  No  No, but  NI  No, but chaged  No
in six Ibanks  accounting  restructrring  changed  firom  from  permitted  to
for 25 percent  of barlking  estimated  to be  permitted  to  prohibited  inl994
systemi  assets.  round 5 percent  of  prohibited  in
GDP.  1998
Denmark  1987-1992"  Cumulative  lam losses  No  No  No  No  No  0  1
over  die periodx  1990-1992
were ! percent  of loais;
40 of  irhe  60 problem
banks  werc merged.
Ecuador  early 1980s'  Implenentation  of  N/A  N/A  NiA  N/A  N/A  I
exchasige  pro5rans
(domestic  for foreign
debt) tr  bail oet banking
systet.
1996-  Authirities  imlrervened  in  N/A  N/A  NA  N/A  N/A
ongoirg'  severld  smaller  finmsicial
institutions  in late 1995  to
early 1996  andi  in the fifth
largest  commercial  bank
in 196.  Seven  financial
instituitions,  wTich
accounted  for 25-30
percest  of  coetmercial
banking  assess,  wear
closed  in 19911/99.  In
Mares 1999.  authorities
declared  a omne  weel;  bank
holid  ly
Egypt, Arab  early 1980s'  Government  closed  Nine ste-owned  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A
Rep.  several  large investrent  commercial  banks
companies.  recorded  NPL
Four public sector  banks  ratios  of 37 percent
were given  estpital  on average  in
assistance.  1989.
1991-1995'  Four  public arctor  banks  N/A  N/A  M/A  N/A  N/A
were  given capital
assistance.
El Salvador  1989 9  Nine statovned  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A
comtercial tbanks
recorded  NPI. rados of 37
percent  on average  in
1989.
Finland  1991-1994'  Savirgs  banking  sector  Recap.  costs  No  No  No  No  No
badly  affected;  amounted  to II
Government  took control  percent  of GDP.
of three  banks  that
together  accounted  for 31
perosnt  of towal  system
deposits.
Ghana  1982-19899  Seven  audited  banks  (out  Resbrructuming  coss  N/A  N/A  NI/A  N/A  N/A  I  I
of  ]1)  insolvent;  nna  mtimated  at 6
banhing  sectDr  afficted.  percent  of GNP.
46Table 12 (continued)
Banking Crises:  Dates, Costs and Bank Regulatory Responses
Change  in Regulations  for Allowable Activities:  Yes or No  Coding of Banking Crises
Country  Year of  of  Problm  Estimate  of Totat  Bank  Ownership  Non-financial
Crisis  Scope  Losses/Costs  Securities  Insurance  Real Estate  of Non-finandal  Firm Ownership  Systenmic  Major
F'irms  of  Banks
Ghana  1997  NPL levels  increased  One  large  No  No  No  No  No
ongoing*'  sharply  during 1997  from  investnent  bank
15.5  percent  of  loans  fails.
outstanding  to 26.5  Non-performing
pecent  Two  state-owned assets of  the 27
conumercial  banks  public  sector  banks
accounting  for 33.9  estimated  at 19.5
percent  of market  share  in  percent  of total
bad shape. Three  banks,  loans  and  advances
accounting  for 3.6  percent  as  of end of March
of  market share  in terms o  1995. Non-
Nine Deposit  Taking  pesforming  assets
Companies  failed.  to total assets
Seven  banks  or Deposit  reached 10.8
Taking  institutions  were  percent in 1993-
either  liquidated  or  taken  1994.  At end 1998.
over.  NPLs  estimated  at
16  percent of  total
Hong Kong  1982-1983** Nine DepositTaking  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  I
Companies  failed.
1983-1986"  Seven  banks  or Deposit  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A
Taking  Instituoions  were
either  liquidated  or  taken
over.
19985'  One  large  investment  bank  No  No  No  No  No
fails
India  1993-  Non-performing  assets  of  No  No  No  No  No  0  1
ongoing"  the 27 public  sector  banks
estimated  at 19.5  percent
of total loans  and
advances  as of end of
March 1995.  Non-
perfonming  assets  to total
assets  reached  10.8
percent  in 1993-1994.  At
end 1998,  NPLs  estimated
at 16  percent  of total
loans.
Indonesia  1994"'  Classified  assets  equal  to  RecapiaWization  Yes, a  No  No  No  No  I  I
over 14  percent  of  banking cost  for five state  regulation
system  assets  with over 70 banks expected  to  prohibiting
percent  in the state  banks.  amount  to 1.8  banks  from
percent of  GDP.  underwriting
securities











1997-  As  of March 1999,  Bank  Fiscal  costs  No  No  No  No  No
ongoing'  of Indonesia  had closed  estimated  to ramge
down  61 banks  and  from 50-55  percent
nationalized  54 banks,  of  a of GDP.
total of 240. NPLs
estimates  for the total
banking  system  range
from  65-75 percent  of
total loans.
Italy  1990-1995** During  1990-1994,58  No  No  No  No, but  changed  No  0  I
banks  (accounting  for 11  from prohibited  to
percent of  total lending)  restricted  in 1995
were  merged  with  other
institutions.
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Banking Crises:  Dates, Costs and Bank Regulatory Responses
Change in Regulatio ns for Allowable Aeiivities:  Yes or No  Coding of Banking  Crises
Country  Year  f  9pe  of Problm  Estimate  of Total  Bank Ownership  No-financial
riss  LossesCosts  Securities  Insurance  Real Estate  of Non-financial  Firm Ownership  Systemic  Major
Firms  of tanks
Japan  1990s'  Ban-ks  suffsingfrom  In 1996,  rescue  No  No  Nc  No  No
sharp decline  in stock  costs  estimated  at
market  and read  estate  over USD  100  bn.
prices;  official  estimate  of  In 199S.
NPLs 40 trillion  Yen  govrnment of
(USD 469  billion) in 1995 Japan  annoumced
(10 pErcent  of GDPWM;  the Obuchi  Plan
unofficial  estimates  put  which  provides  60
NPLs  at I trillion  or 25  trillion  Yen  (USD
perceit of  GDP;  for some  500 billion),  about
of barl  loans,  banks save  12.3  percent  of
alreadly  made provisions.  GDP,  in public
At eni  199S,  intal banking funds for  loan
systerm  NPLs estimaited  at  losses
Yen E  7.5  brillion  (USD  recapitalization  of
725 billion) about 1.7.9  banks  and
pereent  of GrIP. In March depositor
1999.  Hakkaido  proteion
Takuwnodu  bank clIsed,
Long  Term  Credit Elank
nationalised,  Yatsuda
Trust  merged  with 1-uji
Bank, and Mitsui  Trnust
merged  with  Chuo Trust
Korea, Republic 1997-  ByMarbch  1999,  twa out  Fisca costs  of  No  No, but  No  No  No
of  ongoing*  of  26 commer  cial  banks  crisis  estimated  to  changed  from
accouiting  for  I Il.  reach  34%  in 1999.  prohibited  to
percent of  total banking  peintted  in
systen assets natiosalized;  1995
5 barks, accountinxg  for
7.S  percent  ot total
bark'sng  system  assets
closed.  Sevun  banks
accoumting  f*r  3S percent
of  banking  system issets.
placed  under  special
supewvision.  Overall,
banking  system  NPL
expected  to peak at 30-40
percnt-
Madapscar  198SS'  25  p.rcent ofbanking  No  No  ISo  N/A  N/A
sectCT  loans  deemned
irrecDverable.
Malaysia  19S5-49SS'  Insolvent  isnstitutio  as  Reported  losses  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A
account  for 3.4  percent of  equivalent  to 4.7
finarcial  sysiem  deposits;  percent  of GNP.
margi*ally  capitalized  and
perihps insolvent
instisutions  account  for
another  4.4 percent  of
financial  system  deposits.
1997-  Finance  compamy  sector  is  Net  loss estimated No, but  No, but  1N0  No, but changed  No
ongo-ng  being  restrctured and  at USD  14.9  ba, or  changed  changed from  from restricted to
number  of  finance  20.5  perent of  from  restricted  to  pesrnitted in 1991
companies  is to be  GDP  by 1999.  restricted to  permitted in
reduced  fross 39 to)  16  peimitted in  1991
throigh mergers. 'Two  1991
finawce  companies  were
taken  over by Cenwal
Bank  including  Maf




accomnting  Ibr 14.2
perent of financidl
system  assews,  to be
morged  withi  othet banks.
Oveall, at end  199,
NPLs  estimtted  between
25-:15  percnt of tDtal
_________banking  system  asets.
48Table 12 (continued)
Banking Crises:  Dates, Costs and Bank Regulatory  Responses
Change in Regulations  for Allowable Activities:  Yes or No  Coding  of Banking  Crises
Country  Year  of  Scope  ofProblem  Estimate  of Total  Bank  Ownersbip  Non-financial
Crisis  Losses/Costs  Securities  Isurance  Real Estate  of Non-financial  Firm  Ownership  Systemic  Major
Firms  of Banks
Mexico  1981/82  Government  took over  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A
(perhaps until  troubled banking  system.
reprivatized
199O/91)'
1995-  Out of 34 commercial  Distressed banks  No  No  No  No  No
ongoing  banks as of  1994, nine  accounted for 3.9
banks were intervened in  percent of banking





banks accounted for  18.9
percent of total financial
system assets and were
deemed in
1993: insolvent banks
account for 20 perent  of
tota  assets and 22 percent
of banking system
deposits; 1995: almost
half of the banks reported
to be in financial  distress.
Nigeria  1990s*  1993; insolvent banks  No  No  No  No  No
account for 20 percent of
total assets  and 22 percent
of banking system
deposits; 1995:  almost
half of tie  banks  reported
to be in financial  distress
1997*"  Distressed  banks  No  No  No  No  No
accounted for 3.9 percent
of banking system assets.
Norway  19S7-93'  Central  Bank provided  Recapitalization  No  No  No  No  No  l
special loans to six banks,  costs amounted to
suffering from post-oil  S percent of  GDP.
recession  of 19S5-S6 and
from problem  real estate
loans; state took control  of
three  largest banks
(equivalent  toS5 percent
of bankig  system  assets,
whose loan losses had
wiped out capital), partly
through  a Government
Bank Investment  Fund
(Nkr 5 billion) and tie
state-backed  Bank
Insurance  Fund bad to
increase  capital to Nkr  11
billion.
Peru  1983-1990'  Two large  banks failed.  No  No  No  No  No
The rest of the system
suffered  from high levels




nationalization  of tie
banking system in 1987.
PhlDippines  1981-1987'  Two public  banks  At its peak, cntmal  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A
accounting for 50 percent  bank assistance  to
of banking system assets,  financial
six private basns  institutions
accounting for  12 percent  amounted  to 19.1
of barkng  system assets,  bh pesos (3 percent
32 thrifts accounting for  of GDP).
53.2 percent of thrift
banking assets and  128
rural banks.
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Banking Crises:  Dates, Costs and Bank Regulatory Responses
Change  in Regulations  for Allowable  Activities: Yes or No  Coding of  Banking Crises
Country  Year of  ope of  Problem  Estimate ofTotal  Bank Ownership  Non-financial
Crisis  LoSS/Costs  Secerities  Inurance  Real  Estate  of  Non-financial  FirmOwnership  Systemic  Major
Flrms  of Banks
Philippines  1998-  SinceJarmayl9°8  one  Net loss  estimated  No  No  No,  No  No
ongoing*  commercial  bink, seven  at  USD  4.0 bh,  or
out of  8  trifis  and 40 out 6.7 percent  of GDP
of 750 rural banks  have  by 1999.
been placed uider
receivership.  Banking
systers  NPLs  ireached  10.8
perenit by August  of 1998
and 11.4 percent  by
Novenber 1998 Expected
to re&-ch  20 percent  in
1999.
SriLanka  1989-19 9 33  State-ownedbanks  Restucturingcost  N/A  N/A  NI'A  N/A  N/A
comprising  70 percent  of  amounted  to 25 bn
banking  system  estimated  rupees (5  pernt
to have  non-performing  of GDP)
loan ratio  of about  35
perca t
Sweden  1991,  Nordbanken  fadGota  Costof  No  No  No  Yes, chasngedfrom  No  I
Bank insolvait,  recapitelization  prohibited  to
accotnting for  21.6  amounted  to 4  restricted  in
percent  of total baeking  percent  of GDP.  August 1991
system  assets.  Spaubanken
Foresta  intenened,
accontmig  fer 24  percent
of total banking  system
assebm  Ovenal,  five of  six
large  tbanks,,  accoimting
for over  70 pereent  of
bank-ng  system assets
expeienced  fiflcoclties.
Tanzania  Late 1980s;  1987:  the main  finndcal  1987:  implied  N/A  N/A  IN/A  N/A  N/A
199Ds  imsitutions  had armars  losses  amount  to
amnomting  to  half ofitheir  nearly 10  percent
portfolio;  1995:  Tbe  of GNP.
Natioinal  Bank  of
Commerce  which
accownted  for 95  percent
of baninkg  systen assets,
insolvent  since 1990-92,
possibly  longer.
Thailand  1983  19S7'  Authorities  intervened  in  Government  cost  N/A  N/A  TVA  N/A  N/A
50 fitance amd  secarity  for 50  finance
firra  & 5 commer:ial  companies
banks or about  25 percent  estimated  at 0.5
of total finanzial  system  percent  of GNP;
assets; 3 comnercial  govenumnent  cost
bank  s  judged insolvent  for subsidized
(14.  : percent of  loans  amoumted  to
commercial  bankitig  about 0.2  percent
asscs),  of GDP annualy.
Thailand  1997-  Up to March 1999,  Bank  Net  losses  No  No  No  No  No
ongoing  of  TbMiland intemed  in  estmated at USD
70 finance  companies  (out  59.7 bn,  or 42.3
of91) whicl together  percent  of GDP  in
acceunted  foir  12.8  1999.
percent  of finamcial
syst m assets  or 7.2
percent  of finance
company assets. It also
intervened  in six banks
that together  had  t; market
shame  of 12:3  percent  At
end  1998,  banking  system
NPLs  had  reached.  46
pmerent of total lams.
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Banking Crises:  Dates, Costs and Bank Regulatory Responses
Country  Year of  Scope f Problem  Estimate of Total  Change in Regulatfons for Allowable Activities:  Yes or No  Coding of Banking  Crises
Crisis  Losses/Costs  Bank Ownership  Non-ftnancial
Securities  Insurance  Real Estate  of Non-finandal  Firm Ownership  Systemic  Major
Firms  of Blanks
Turkey  1994*  Three  banks  failed  in  Up to June 1994,  No  No  No  No  Yes, changed  from  1  1
April 1994.  authorities  spent  unrestricted  to
1.  1 percent  of  permitted. As of
GDP.  1993,  banks  may
only acquire
shares,  including
bonus  shares,  of 
nonfinancial  fires
up to a maximum
Of I5%  Of fthir
own fimd,  and  the
total sum  of
investmenevt  is these
companies  may not
exceed  60%  of the
banks' tota funds.
United States  1984-1991** More than  1,400  savings  Cost  of  savings  &  No  NO  No  No  NO  0 
& loans  and 1,300  banks  loanclean  up
failed,  amounted  to an
estimated  USD 180
billion  equivalent
to 3.2  percent of
GDOP.
Uruguay  L981-19847  Affected  institutions  Costs of  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A
accounted  for 30 percent  ceapitelizing
of  financial  system  assets; banks estimated  at
insolvent  banks  accounted USD  350 milion
for 20 percent  offinancial  (7 percent  of





andn  purchase  of
loan  portfolios
amounted  to 24.2
percent  of  oGP
during 1982-85.
Venezuela  Late 1970s  Notable  bask  faiures:  NA  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  I  I
anrd  1980s  Bunco  Nacional  de
Dlescuento  (1978);
BANDAGRO  (1  98  1);
Banco  de los Trabajadores
de Venezuela(1982);
Banon  de Comerio
(1985)  BHCUJ  (1985);
BHCO  (1985);  Banco
Lara  (1986).
1994-  Insolvent  banks  accounted  No  No  No  No  No
ongoing*  for 30 percent  of financial
system  deposits.
Authorities  inervened in
13  out  of 47 banks  which
held  50 percent  of deposits
in 1994,  and in five
additional  banks  in 1995.
Zimbabwe  1995-  Two  outof five  No  No  No  No  No
ongoing*  commercial  banks








Source: Authors based  upon Gerald Caprio and Daniela  Klingebiel,  "Episodes of Systematic  and Borderline Financial  Crises",  May 1999, "Global  Survey", Institute of Interneitional  Bankers
various years; and the Office  of the Comptroller of the Currency.
5  1Table  13: Summary  of Enmpirical Results
Bank  Financial  Concentration  &  Industrial  Non-Bank &  Bank Crisis
Inefficiency  Development  Bank per capita  Competition  Stock Market
Securities Restrictions,  ++  ++
Insurance Restrictions
Real Estate restrictions  H-  +
Bank Owning





State-Owned  Bank Assets  +
"+"  indicates a significant posilive correlation
"++"  indicates significant positive relationship,  controlling for GDP per capita and govermnent  quality.
"-"  indicates  a significant negative correlation
"--"  indicates a significant negative relationship, controlling  for GDP per capital  and government  quality.
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53Appendix 1: Bank Regulations and the Socio-Economic  Environrment
This Appendix presents correlations between  the commercial bank regulatory
indicators and the degree of state ownership of banks and a variety of political, cultural, legal,
and economic characteristics. These socio-economic  factors may influence bank regulations and
state ownership of banks.  For instance, it has been found that income diversity and ethnic
diversity influence many policy decisions [see Engermann and Sokoloff, (1998) and Easterly and
Levine (1997)]. Consequently, we examine  the associations  between ethnic and income
diversity and the commercial bank regulatory decisions  of governments. Furthermore, LLSVr
(1998) emphasize  that Common Law Countries  tend to provide greater protection to outside
investors in firms (creditors and minority shareholders). This may influence public demand for
regulation. Thus, we exatnine the relationship between the legal environment and both
regulatory regime and state ownership of banks. Also, regulatory policies reflect the outcome of
political decisions. Thus, it is worth examining whether countries with good public institutions
tend to select particular financial sector policies. Lastly, we include the level of economic
development. Not only is it worth examining whether  relatively successful countries tend to
have particular regulatory/ownership  patterns, but economic development  may be highly
correlated with a variety of institutional and other national traits that are both associated with,
financial sector policies and for which we do not have direct measures. The goal here is to
present some summary statistics regarding the relationship  between the bank regulatory
environment  and the socio-economic environment  more generally. More specifically, the six
indicators that we study are as follows:
Development: Real per capita GDP in 1980 (source: Penn World Tables).
Good Government:  Average value of three variables: (i) risk of expropriation  by the
government, (ii) the degree of corruption, and (iii) the law and order tradition of like
54country. Each variable is based on a scale from 0 to 10, where higher values signify
betlter  government (source: LLSV 1999).
Income Diversity: Average of gini-coefficient  for each country  over the periodl 980-
1995 (source: Deininger and Squire 1996).
Ethnic Diversity: Average value of five indices of ethnolinguistic  fractionalization,
with higher values denoting greater diversity. The scale extends from 0 to I (source:
Easterly and Levine 1997).
Common Law Country: Dummy variable with a value of one if the country has an
English, Common Law, heritage, and zero otherwise (source: LLSV 1999).
Legal Rights of Investors: An index of the legal riphts of creditors and minority
shareholders  (source: computed from LLSV 1998).
Table Al. presents simple correlations (and P-lvalues  for the correlations)  between the
regulatory/ownership  indicators and the six indicators of the national environment. A few
findings worth mentioning are as follows. First, legal hentage and the legal rights of investors
are not strongly associated with commercial banking regulationis  or state ownership of banks.
Second, while ethnic diversity is not highly correlated with the regulatory/ownership
environment,  income diversity is strongly linked. Countries with greater income diversity tend
to have more restrictions on their commercial banks with respect to (i) engaging in securities
market activities and (ii.)  owning nonfinancial firms. Third, governments  in richer countries (and
good governments  - those with low corruption, a strong law and order tradition, and low risk of
13 We  calculate  this fromn  LaPorta,  Lopez-de-Silanes,  Shleifer,  and  Vishny  (1998). Specifically,  for shareholder
rights,  we  add 1 if:  (1) thie  country  allows  the shareholders  to mail  their  proxy  to the firm;  (2)  shareholders  are not
required  to deposit  their shares  prior  to the General  Shareholders'  Meeting;  (3)  cumulative  voting  or proportional
representation  of  minorilies  in  the board  of directors  is allowed;  (4) an oppressed  minorities  mechanism  is in  place;
(5)  the minimum  percentage  of share  capital  that  entitles  a shareholder  to call  for  an Extraordinary  Shareholders'
Meeting is less than or equal to 10 percent (the sample median); or (6) shareholders  have preemptive rights that can
only be waived by a shareholders' vote. Then, we add I for creditor tights if: (7) the country imposes restrictions,
such as creditors' consent, to file for reorganization;  (8) secured  creditors are able to gain possession of their
security once the reorganization  petition has been approved (no automatic stay); (9) secured creditors are ranked
first in the distribution of the proceeds that result from the disposition of assets of a bankrupt firm; and (10) the
debtor does not retain the adninistration of its property pending the resolution of the reorganization. Thus, the legal
rights of investors index can potentially assume values between 0 and 10.
55expropriation)  tend to (i) impose fewer regulatory restrictions on their banks and (ii) own a small
percentage of the banking industry. The level of economic development and the quality of the
government are very highly correlated (0.82)
56  --Table Al
Correlations  for Bank Regulations  and Environment  in which Banks Operate
BANKS OWNING  NONFINANCIAL  STATE  NED
RESTRICT  SECURITIES  INSURANCE  REAL  ESTATE  NONFINANCIAL  FIRMIS  OWNING  SATE-OW  ETS
______________________________________________________FIRMS  BANKS  BANK ASSET
DEVELOPMENT  -0.440  -0.110  -0.378  -0.450  -0.342  -0.050  -0.346
I(.000)  (0.3  9)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.005)  (0.700)  (0.005)
GOOD  -0.374  -0.224  -0.176  -0.374  -0.380  -0.161  -0.286
GOVERNMENT  (0.003)  (0.083)  (0.174)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.230)  (0.030)
INCOME  0.347  0.396  0.106  0.158  0.371  0.195  0.080
DIVERSITY  (0.010)  (0.003)  (0.447)  (0.255)  (0.006)  (0.171)  (0.571)
ETHNIC  0.092  -0.006  0.067  0.134  0.048  0.139  0.042
DIVERSITY  (0.464)  (0.959)  (0.592)  (0.285)  (0.707)  (0.283)  (0.744)
COMMON  -0.060  -0.086  0.093  -0.042  -0.078  0n233  -n_049
LAW  COUNTRY  (0.634)  (0.493)  (0.458)  (0.735)  (0.535)  (0.068)  (0.744)
LEGAL  RIGHTS  OF  -0.069  -0.061  0.092  -0.035  -0.193  0.141  -0.027
INVESTORS  (0.653)  (0.690)  (0.547)  (0.818)  (0.208)  (0.380)  (0.866)
57Table A2
Data on Financial Development  and the Political/Economic  Environment
GOOD  NET INTEREST  PRIVATE  BANK  INDUSTRIAL  TOTAL VALUE  NON-BANK
__  DEVELOPMENT  GOVERNMENT  MARGIN  CREDIT  CONCENTRATION  COMPETITION  TRADED  CREDITS
Argentina  6506  12.7  0.082  0.15  0.57  3.05  0.017  0.01
Australia  12520  20.4  0.019  0.81  0.67  3.04  0.144  0.34
Austria  10509  20.8  0.019  0.87  0.72  4.03  0.040  0.04
Barbados  6379  0.0  0.033  0.40  1.00  0.003  0.08
Belgium  11109  20.9  0.023  0.37  0.62  3.93  0.034
Bolivia  1989  8.0  0.035  0.20  0.46  0.000  0.02
Botswana  1940  16.5  0.052  0.11  0.95  0.005
Brazil  4303  15.2  0.120  0.25  0.68  3.31  0.064  0.09
Canada  14133  21.7  0.018  0.77  0.58  3.90  0.153  0.28
Chile  3892  14.9  0.045  0.50  0.49  3.62  0.038  0.06
Colombia  2946  11.2  0.064  0.27  0.46  2.17  0.007  0.13
Cyprus  5295  15.7  0.067  0.77  0.88  0.015  0.21
Denmark  11342  21.7  0.049  0.42  0.75  4.76  0.064
Ecuador  3238  13.7  0.072  0.19  0.41  0.017  0.04
Egypt, Arab Rep.  1645  11.1  0.012  0.28  0.65  4.19  0.004  0.04
El Salvador  2014  8.3  0.039  0.24  0.86  0.00
Fiji  3609  0.0  0.30  0.02
Finland  10851  21.7  0.016  0.67  0.86  2.77  0.044
France  11756  20.5  0.035  0.91  0.41  3.72  0.084  0.09
Gambia, The  1017  15.0  0.16
Germany  11920  20.8  0.025  0.92  0.44  4.53  0.187  0.07
Ghana  976  10.3  0.071  0.03  0.94  0.004
Greece  5901  15.2  0.035  0.40  0.77  3.18  0.016  0.18
Guatemala  2574  8.2  0.054  0.15  0.43  0.000  0.01
Guyana  1927  7.9  0.044  0.30  1.00  0.08
Hong Kong  8719  18.3  0.020  1.36  0.80  3.88  0.506
Iceian  I  Itu  21.6  0.3  2.00  .5
India  882  13.0  0.030  0.27  0.42  2.87  0.048  0.03
Indonesia  1281  10.8  0.041  0.26  0.43  3.29  0.018
Ireland  6823  19.5  0.016  0.63  0.79  4.07  0.144  0.36
58Table A2 (continued)
Data on Financial  Development  and the Political/Economic  Environment
DEVELOPMENT  GOOD  NET INTEREST  PRIVATE  BANK  INDUSTRIAL  TOTAL VALUE  NON-BANK DEVELOPMENT  GOVERNMENT  MARGIN  CREDIT  CONCENTRATION  COMPETITION  TRADED  CREDITS
Jordan  3384  12.0  0.022  0.62  0.90  2.63  0.091  0.07
Korea, Republic of  3093  14.7  0.023  0.81  nl1  33  45  0.266  0.35
Lesotho  |  994  0.0  0.16  1.00  0.02
Luxer.b-urg  |  11893  22.0  0.007  0.24  0.38  3.00  0.016
Madagascar  I  984  11.7  0.060  0.16  0.96
Malaysia  3799  16.5  0.025  0.80  0.54  3.88  0.427  0.21
Malta  4483  14.0  0.023  0.60  0.97  0.11
Mexico  6054  13.4  0.053  0.18  0.59  2.76  0.063  0.03
Netherlands  11284  22.0  0.015  1.28  0.73  4.77  0.191  0.54
New Zealand  10362  21.7  0.025  0.54  0.77  3.40  0.080  0.13
Nigeria  1438  8.8  0.047  0.15  0.83  0.000  0.02
Norway  12141  21.9  0.031  0.89  0.85  3.47  0.061  0.40
Pakistan  1110  9.2  0.029  0.23  0.78  0.019
Peru  2875  9.9  0.072  0.10  0.72  2.94  0.014  0.03
Philippines  1879  8.6  0.042  0.29  0.47  2.67  0.053  0.07
Portugal  4982  18.5  0.035  0.63  0.45  4.27  0.021
Rwanda  757  0.0  0.044  0.08  1.00  0.01
'IMlA  1 A  An
Singapore  7053  19.4  0.021  0.95  0.73  4.16  0.446  0.16
South Africa  3496  14.9  0.039  0.79  0.78  2.28  0.076  0.28
Spain  7390  18.6  0.038  0.72  0.46  4.06  0.062  0.06
Sri Lanka  1635  10.2  0.051  0.19  0.83  0.013
Suriname  3737  8.6  0.37
Sweden  12456  21.4  0.027  1.09  0.89  2.86  0.137  0.64
Switzerland  14301  22.0  0.016  1.78  0.74  4.00  0.975  0.34
Tanzania  480  13.2
Thailand  2178  14.3  0.030  0.68  0.54  2.62  0.203  0.17
Turkey  2874  13.2  0.094  0.14  0.45  3.14  0.062  0.01
United Kingdom  10167  20.3  0.020  0.74  0.58  4.46  0.355
United States  15295  21.2  0.039  1.31  0.18  4.22  0.344  0.66
Uruguay  5091  12.6  0.056  0.31  0.86  0.001
Venezuela  7401  13.5  0.078  0.39  0.52  2.28  0.014  0.18
Zimbabwe  1206  11.1  0.044  0.22  0.82  2.40  0.010  0.09
59Table A3
Banking Crises Around the Globe
Systemic  Major  |_  |_Systemic  Major
Argentina  1  1  New Zealand  0  0
Australia  0  0  Nigeria  1  1
Austria  0  0  Norway  1  I
Barbados  0  0  Pakistan  0  0
Belgium  0  0  Peru  1  1
Bolivia  I  I  Philippines  1  I
Botswana  0  0  Portugal  0  0
Brazil  1  1  Rwanda  0  0
Canada  0  1  Seychelles  0  0
Chile  I  I  Singapore  0  0
Colombia  1  1  South Africa  0  0
Cyprus  0  0  Spain  0  0
Denmark  0  1  SriLanka  1  1
Ecuador  1  1  Suriname  0  0
Egypt, Arab Rep.  1  1  Sweden  1  1
El Salvador  1  1  Switzerland  0  0
Fiji  0  0  Tanzania  1  1
Finland  I  I  Thailand  I  I
France  0  0  Turkey  1  1
Gambia, The  0  0  United Kingdom  0  0
Germany  0  0  United States  0  1
Ghana  1  1  Uruguay  1  I
Greece  0  0  Venezuela  1  1
Guatemala  0  0  Zimbabwe  1
Guyana  0  0
Hong Kong  0  1
Iceland  0  0
India  0 
Indonesia  1  1
Ireland  0  0
Israel  0  0
Italy  0  1
Japan  1  1
Jordan  0  0
Korea, Republic of  1  1
Lesotho  0  0
Luxembourg  0  0
Madagascar  1  1
Malaysia  1  1
Malta  0  0
Mexico  1  1
Netherlands  0  0
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